To those who fail to heed their own words–be warned–you never know who is listening. Loved people are loving people. Reality is a nuisance to whose who want to make it up as they go along. When you make a World tolerable for yourself, you make a World tolerable for others. One should cloak oneself in the love of God. One gets out of the spiritual life only what one puts into it, but sometimes one gets rather more, like inner consolation. Jesus is in dialog with the willing soul; even with the unwilling soul He is always trying to start a conversation. All the good soul needs to survive imprisonment in the body is food and light; that is to say, Sacrament and Scripture. We are to practice things like humanity of Christ, prayer, knowledge of self, fulfillment of obligations, the practice of virtue, the avoidance of vice, retirement from the World, devotional reading of the Scriptures, and a prickly restlessness with intellectuality for its own sake. When you receive Sacrament, Spiritual Grace is conferred, and Virtue dimmed is restored to its original beauty. Once covered with soot and sin, the pallid soul will soon blush into a full palette of colours. I am free, I am bound to nobody’s word, except to those inspired by God; if I oppose these in the least degree, I beseech God to forgive me my audacity of judgment, as I have been moved not so much by longing for some opinion of my own as by love for the freedom of science. What is the relation between faith and science? Many people—Christians and non-Christians alike—answer, “Conflict.” Reason must be assisted by observation and experiment in matters of science, and by spiritual revelation in matters of faith. #RandolphHarris 1 of 22

As God’s creatures, we are dependent upon God’s sustaining power, moment by moment. Our dependence upon and allegiance to God frees us from bondage to anybody’s word, except to what we find in God’s books. We are freed even to investigate that most marvelous wonder of nature—human nature. What the Christian Bible urges upon us is a complete transformation in our relations to God and our fellow creatures, and to the World that God has made. This transformation means a liberation from old superstitious bonds and from any kind of idolatry, including the idols of common opinion and official doctrines. We who have been touched by the Spirit may respect human authorities in church, state, or science, but we will not be so deeply impressed by them that we give up our independence. Our liberation implies also a new obedience by which we must be willing to submit all our prejudices and all our prior criteria of reasonableness to test of divine revelation, including the reality of the Universe around us. Even to ordinary persons moments can come which can pass very easily into glimpses. However, their importance is not recognized and so the opportunities are missed. It is pitiful and pathetic that anyone should be so close to the diviner self and not take advantage of the propinquity by a pause of activity and a surrender to the delicate feeling which would develop of itself into a glimpse. It is pathetic, because these moments are in the nature of clues leading to the inward way; pitiful, because such people are living in a kind of blind alley and must one day retrace their steps. #RandolphHarris 2 of 22

This kind of thing is supposed to lie outside common experience, but the fact is that it comes more often through Nature, art, or music than most people suspect. There is a moment in most human’s lives when they are close to an understanding of the World’s real nature. The concepts of justice and goodness are linked with distinct principles and the question of congruence is whether these two families of criteria fit together. More precisely, each concept with its associated principles defines a point of view from which institutions, actions, and plans of life can be assessed. A sense of justice is an effective desire to apply and to acts from the principles of justice and so from the point of view of justice. This what is to be established is that it is rational (as defined by the thin theory of the good) for those in a well-ordered society to affirm their sense of justice as regulative of their plan of life. It remains to be shown that this disposition to take up and to be guided by the standpoint of justice accords with the individual’s good. Whether these two points of view are congruent is likely to be a crucial factor in determining stability. However, congruence is not a foregone conclusion even in a well-ordered society. We must verify it. Of course, the rationality of choosing the principles of justice in the original position is not in question. The argument for this decision has already been made; and if it is sound, just institutions are collectively rational and to everyone’s advantage from a suitably general perspective. It is also rational for each to urge others to support these arrangements and to fulfill their duties and obligations. #RandolphHarris 3 of 22

The problem is whether the regulative desire to adopt the standpoint of justice belongs to a person’s own good when viewed in the light of the thin theory with no restriction on information. We should like to know that this desire is indeed rational; being rational for one, it is rational for all, and therefore no tendencies to instability exist. More precisely, consider any given person in a well-ordered society. One knows, I assume, that institutions are just and that others have (and will continue to have) a sense of justice similar to one’s, and therefore that they comply (and will continue to comply) with these arrangements. We want to show that on these suppositions it is rational for someone, as defined by the thin theory, to affirm one’s sense of justice. The plan of life which does this is one’s best reply to the similar plans of one’s associates; and being rational for anyone, it is rational for all. It is important not to confuse this problem with that of justifying being a just human to an egoist. An egoist is someone committed to the point of view of one’s own interests. One’s final ends are related to oneself: one’s wealth and position, one’s pleasures and social prestige, and so on. Such a human may act justly, that is, do things that a just human would do; but so long s one remains an egoist, one cannot do them for the just human’s reasons. Having these reasons is inconsistent with being an egoist. It merely happens that on some occasions the point of view of justice and that of one’s own interests lead to the same course of action. #RandolphHarris 4 of 22

Therefore I am not trying to show that in a well-ordered society an egoist would act from a sense of justice, nor even that one would act justly because so acting would best advance one’s ends. Nor, again, are we to argue that an egoist, finding oneself in a just society, would be well advised, given one’s aims, to transform oneself into a just human. Rather, we are concerned with the goodness of the settled desire to take up the standpoint of justice. I assume that the members of a well-ordered society already have this desire. The question is whether this regulative sentiment is consistent with their good. We are not examining the justice or the moral worth of actions from certain points of view; we are assessing the goodness of the desire to adopt a particular point of view, that of justice itself. And we must evaluate this desire not from the egoist’s standpoint, whatever this might be, but in the light of the thin theory of the good. Human actions spring from existing desires and these can be changed only gradually. We cannot just decide at a given moment to alter our system of ends. We act know as the sort of person we are and from the wants we have now, and not as the sort of person we might have been or from desires we would have had if earlier we had only chosen differently. Regulative aims are especially subject to this constraint. Thus we decide well in advance whether to affirm our sense of justice by trying to assess our situation over a frilly extensive future. We cannot have things bot ways. We cannot preserve a sense of justice and all that this implies while at the same time holding ourselves ready to act unjustly should not doing so promise some personal advantage. A just person is not prepared to do certain things, and if one is tempted too easily, one was prepared after all. #RandolphHarris 5 of 22

Our question concerns then only those with a certain psychology and system of desires. It would obviously be demanding too much to require that stability should not depend upon definite restrictions in this respect. Now on one interpretation the question has an obvious answer. Supposing that someone has an effective sense of justice, one will then have a regulative desire to comply with the corresponding principles. The criteria of rational choice must take this desire into account. If a person wants with deliberative rationality to act from the standpoint of justice above all else, it is rational for one so to act. Therefore in this form the question is trivial: being the sorts of persons they are, the members of a well-ordered society desire more than anything to act justly and fulfilling this desire is part of their good. To do justly means acting honourably with God and other people. We act honourably with others by loving mercy. As followers of Jesus Christ, we strive—and are encouraged to strive—to do better and be better. Without the blessings that come from Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ, we can never do enough or be enough by ourselves. The good news, though, is that because of and through Jesus Christ we can become enough. All people will be saved from physical death by the grace of God, through the death and Resurrection of Jesus Christ. And if we turn our hearts to God, salvation from spiritual death is available to all through the Atonement of Jesus Christ, by obedience to the laws and ordinance of the Gospel. #RandolphHarris 6 of 22

We can be redeemed from sin to stand clean and pure before God. Once we acquire a sense of justice that is truly final and effective, as the precedence of justice requires, we are confirmed in a plan of life that, insofar as we are rational, leads us to preserve and to encourage this sentiment. Since this fact is public knowledge, instability of the first kind does not exist, and hence neither does that of the second. The real problem of congruence is what happens if we imagine someone to give weight to one’s sense of justice only to the extent that it satisfies other descriptions which connect it with reasons specified by the thin theory of the good. We should not rely on the doctrine of the pure conscientious act. Suppose, then, that the desire to act justly is not a final desire like that to avoid pain, misery, or apathy, or the desire to fulfill the inclusive interests. The theory of justice supplies other descriptions of what the sense of justice is a desire for; and we must use these to show that a person following the thin theory of the good would indeed confirm this sentiment as regulative of one’s plan of life. For the grounds of congruence to be established, as the contract doctrine requires, the principles of justice are public: they characterize the commonly recognized moral convictions shared by the members of a well-ordered society. We are not concerned with someone who is questioning these principles. By hypothesis, one concedes as everyone else does that they are best choice from the standpoint of the original position. (Of course, this can always be doubted but it raises an entirely different matter.) #RandolphHarris 7 of 22

Now since others are assumed to have (and continue to have) an effective sense of justice, our hypothetical individual is considering in effect a policy of pretending to have certain moral sentiments, all the while being ready to act as a free-rider whenever the opportunity arises to further one’s personal interest. Since the conception of justice is public, one is debating whether to set out on a systematic course of deception and hypocrisy, professing without belief, as it suits one’s purpose, the accepted moral views. That deception and hypocrisy are wrongs does not, I assume, bother one; but one will have to reckon with the psychological cost of taking precautions and maintaining one’s pose, and the loss of spontaneity and naturalness that results. In most societies as things are, such pretensions may no have a high price, since the injustice of institutions and the often squalid behaviour of others renders one’s own deceits easier to endure; but in a well-ordered society there is not this comfort. These remarks are supported by the fact that there is a connection between acting justly and natural attitudes. Given the content of the principles of justice and the laws of moral psychology, wanting to be fair with our friends and wanting to give justice to those we care for is as much a part of these affections as the desire to be with them and to feel sad at their loss. Assuming therefore that one needs these attachments, the policy contemplated is presumably that of acting justly only towards those whom we are bound by tires of affection and fellow feeling, and of respecting ways of life to which we are devoted. #RandolphHarris 8 of 22

However, in a well-ordered society these bonds extend widely, and include ties to intuitional forms, assuming here that all three psychological laws are fully effective. In addition, we cannot in general select who is to be injured by our unfairness. For example, if we cheat on paying our taxes, or if we find some way to avoid doing our fair share for the community, everyone is hurt, our friends and associates along with the est. To be sure, we might consider covertly passing on part of our gains to those we especially like, but this becomes a dubious and involved affair. Thus in a well-ordered society where effective bonds are extensive both to persons and to social forms, and we cannot select who is to lose by our defections, there are strong grounds for preserving one’s sense of justice. Doing this protects in a natural and simple way the institutions and persons we care for and leads us to welcome new and broader social tires. Another basic consideration is this: it follows from the Aristotelian Principle (and its companion effect) that participating in the life of a well-ordered society is a great good. This conclusion depends upon the meaning of the principles of justice and their precedence in everyone’s plans as well as upon the psychological features of our nature. It is the details of the contract view which establish this connection. Because such a society is a social union of social unions, it realizes to a preeminent degree the various forms of human activity; and given the social nature of humankind, the fact that our potentialities and inclinations far surpass what can be expressed in any one life, we depend upon the cooperative endeavours of others not only for the means of well-being but to bring to fruition our latent powers. #RandolphHarris 9 of 22

And with a certain success all around, each enjoys the greater richness and diversity of the collective activity. Yet to share fully in this life we must acknowledge the principles of its regulative conception, and this means that we must affirm our sentiment of justice. To appreciate something as ours, we must have a certain allegiance to it. What binds society’s efforts into one social union is the mutual recognition and acceptance of the principles of justice; it is this general affirmation which extends the ties of identification over the whole community and permits the Aristotelian Principles to have its wider effect. Individual and group accomplishments are no longer seen as just so many separate personal goods. Whereas not to confirm our sense of justice is to limit ourselves to a narrow view. Finally, there is the reason connected with the Kantian interpretation: acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal rational beings. The desire to act justly and the desire to express our nature as free moral persons turn out to specify what is practically speaking the same desire. When someone has true beliefs and a correct understanding of the theory of justice, these two desires move one in the same way. They are both dispositions to act from precisely the same principle: namely, those that would be chosen in the original position. Of course, this contention is based on a theory of justice. If his theory is unsound, the practical identity fails. However, since we are concerned only with the special case of a well-ordered society as characterized by the theory, we are entitled to assume that its members have a lucid grasp of the public conception of justice upon which their relations are founded. #RandolphHarris 10 of 22

Let us supposed that these are the chief reasons (or typical thereof) which the thin account of the good allows for maintaining one’s sense of justice. The question now arises whether they are decisive. Here we confront the familiar difficulty of a balance of motives which in many ways is similar to a balance of first principles. Sometimes the answer is found by comparing one balance of reasons with another, for surely if the first balance clearly favours one course of action then the second will also, should its reasons supporting this alternative be stronger and its reasons supporting the other alternatives be weaker. However, arguing from such comparisons presupposes some configurations of reasons which evidently go one way rather than another to serve as a bench mark. Failing these, we cannot get beyond conditional comparisons: if the first balance favours a certain choice, then the second does also. Now at this point it is obvious that the content of the principles of justice is a crucial element in the decision. Whether it is for a person’s good that one have a regulative sense of justice depends upon what justice requires of him. The congruence of the right and the good is determined by the standards by which each concept is specified. Utilitarianism is more strict than common sense in demanding the sacrifice of the agent’s private interests when this is necessary for the greater happiness of all. It is also more exacting than the contract theory, for while beneficent acts going beyond our natural duties are good actions and evoke our esteem, they are not required as a matter of right. #RandolphHarris 11 of 22

Utilitarianism may seem to be a more exalted ideal, but the other side of it is that it may authorize the lesser welfare and liberty of some for the sake of a greater happiness of others who ma already be more fortunate. A rational person, in framing one’s plan, would hesitate to give precedence to so stringent a principle. It is likely both to exceed one’s capacity for sympathy and to be hazardous to one’s freedom. Thus however improbable the congruence of the right and the good in justice as fairness, it is surely more probable than on the utilitarian view. The conditional balance of reasons favours the contract doctrines. A somewhat different point is suggested by the following doubt: namely, that while the decision to preserve our sentiment of justice might be rational, we may in end suffer a very great loss or even be ruined by it. As we have seen, a just person is not prepare to do certain things, and so in the face of evil circumstances one may decide to chance death rather than to act unjustly. Yet although it is true enough that for the sake of justice a human may lose one’s life where another would live to a later day, the just human does all things considered one most want; in this sense one is not defeated by ill fortune the possibility of which one foresaw. The question is on a par with the hazards of love; indeed, it is simply a special case. Those who love one another, or who acquire strong attachments to persons and to forms of life, at the same time become liable to ruin: their love makes them hostages to misfortune and the injustice of others. Friends and lovers take great chances to help each other; and members of families willing to do the same. Their being so disposed belongs to their attachments as much as any other inclination. Once we love we are vulnerable: there is no such thing as loving while being ready to consider water to love, just like that.  And the loves that may hurt the least are not the best loves. #RandolphHarris 12 of 22

When we love we accept the danger of injury and loss. In view of our general knowledge of the likely course of life, we do not think these risks so great as to cause us to cease loving. Should evils occur, they are the object of our aversions, and we resist those whose machinations bring them about. If we are loving we do not regret our love. Now if these things are true of love as the World is, or very often is, then a fortiori they would appear to be true of loves in a well-ordered society, and so of the sense of justice too. For in a society where others are just our loves expose us mainly to the accidents of nature and the contingency of circumstances. And similarly for the sentiment of justice which is connected to these affections. Taking as a bench mark the balance of reasons that leads us to affirm our loves as things are, it seems that we should be ready once we become of age to maintain our sense of justice in the more favourable conditions of a just society. One special feature of the desires to express our nature as moral persons strengthens this conclusion. With other inclinations of the self, there is a choice of degree and scope. Our policy of deception and hypocrisy need not be completely systematic; our affective ties to institutions and to other persons can be more or less strong, and our participation in the wider life of society more or less full. There is a continuum of possibilities and not an all or nothing decision, although for simplicity I have spoken pretty much in these terms. #RandolphHarris 13 of 22

However, the desire to express our nature as a free and equal rational being can be fulfilled only by acting on the principles of right and justice as having first priority. This is a consequence of the condition of finality: since these principles are regulative, the desire to act upon them is satisfied only to the extent that it is likewise regulative with respect to other desires. It is acting from this precedence that expresses our freedom from contingency and happenstance. Therefore in order to realize our nature we have no alternative but to plan to preserve our sense of justice as governing our other aims. If it is compromised and balanced against other ends as but one desire among the rest, this sentiment cannot be fulfilled. It is desire to conduct oneself in a certain way above all else, a striving that contains within itself its own priority. Other aims can be achieved by a plan that allows a place for each, since their satisfaction is possible independent of their place in the ordering. However, this is not the case with the sense of right and justice; and therefore acting wrongly is always liable to arouse feelings of guilt and shame, the emotions aroused by the defeat of our regulative moral sentiments. Of course, this does not mean that the realization of our nature as a free and rational being is itself an all or nothing affair. To the contrary, how far we succeed in expressing our nature depends upon how consistently we act from our sense of justice as finally regulative. #RandolphHarris 14 of 22

What we cannot do is express our nature by following a plan that views the sense of justice as but one desire to be weighed against others. For this sentiment reveals what the person is, and to compromise it is not to achieve for the self free reign but to give way to the contingences and accidents of the World. One last question must be mentioned. Suppose that even in a well-ordered society there are some persons for whom the affirmation of their sense of justice is not a good. Given their aims and wants and the peculiarities of their nature, the thin account of the good does not define reasons sufficient for them to maintain this regulative sentiment. It has been argued that to these persons one cannot truthfully recommend justice as a virtue. And this is surely correct, assuming such a recommendation to imply that rational grounds (identified by the thin theory) counsel this course for them as individuals. However, then the further question remains whether those who do affirm their sense of justice are treating these persons unjustly in requiring them to comply with just institutions. Now unhappily we are not yet in a position to answer this query properly, since it presupposes a theory of punishment and I have said very little about this part of the theory of justice. I have assumed strict compliance with any conception that would be chosen and then considered which one on the list presented would be adopted. However, we may reason much as we did in the case of civil disobedience, another part of partial compliance theory. #RandolphHarris 15 of 22

Thus granting that adherence to whatever conception is acknowledged will be imperfect if left completely voluntary, under what conditions would the persons in the original position agree that stabilizing penal devices can be employed Would they insist that a person can be required to do only what is to one’s advantage as defined by the thin theory? It seems clear, in the light of the contract doctrine as a whole, that they would not. For this restriction amounts in effect to general egoism which, as we have seen, would be rejected. Moreover, the principles of right and justice are collectively rational; and it is in the interest of each that everyone else should comply with just arrangements. It is also the case that the general affirmation of the sense of justice is a great social asset, establishing the basis for mutual trust and confidence from which all normally benefit. Thus in agreeing to penalties that stabilize a scheme of cooperation the parties accept the same kind of constraint on self-interest that they acknowledge in choosing the principle of justice in the first place. Having agreed to these principles in view of the reasons already surveyed, it is rational to authorize the measures need to maintain just institutions, assuming that the constraints of equal liberty and the rule of law are duly recognized. Those who find that being disposed to act justly is not a good for them cannot deny these contentions. It is, of course, true that in their case just arrangements do not fully answer to their nature, and therefore, other things equal, they will be less happy than they would be if they could affirm their sense of justice. However, here one can only say: their nature is their misfortune. #RandolphHarris 16 of 22

The main point then is that to justify a conception of justice we do not have to contend that everyone, whatever one’s capacities and desires, has a sufficient reason (as defined by the thin theory) to preserve one’s sense of justice. For our good depends upon the sorts of persons we are, the kinds of wants and aspirations we have and are capable of. It can even happen that there are many who do not find a sense of justice for their good; but if so, the forces making for stability are weaker. Under such conditions penal devices will play a much larger role in the social system. The greater the lack of congruence, the greater the likelihood, other things equal, of instability with its attendant evils. Yet none of this nullifies the collective rationality of the principles of justice; it is still to the advantage of each that everyone else should honour them. At least this holds true so long as the conception of justice is not so unstable that some other conception would be preferable. However, what I have tried to show is that the contract doctrine is superior to its rivals on this score, and therefore that the choice of principles in the original position need not be reconsidered. In fact, granted a reasonable interpretation of human sociability (provided by the account of how a sense of justice is acquired and by the idea of social union), justice as fairness appears to be a sufficiently stable conception. The hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and good. #RandolphHarris 17 of 22

Of course, under normal conditions public knowledge and confidence are always imperfect. So even in a just society it is reasonable to admit certain constraining arrangements to insure compliance, but their main purpose is to underwrite citizens’ trust in other another. These mechanisms will seldom be invoked and will comprise but a minor part of the social scheme. Congruence allows us to complete the sequence of applications of the definition of goodness. We can say first that, in a well-ordered society, being a good person (and in particular having an effective sense of justice) is indeed a good for that person; and second that this form of society is a good society. The first assertation follows from congruence; the second holds since a well-ordered society has the properties that it is rational to want in a society from the two relevant points of view. Thus a well-ordered society satisfies the principles of justice which are collectively rational from the perspective of the original position; and from the standpoint of the individual, the desire to affirm the public conception of justice as regulative of one’s plan of life accords with the principles of rational choice. These conclusions support the values of community, and in reaching them my account of justice as fairness is completed. Humankind has a moral nature. Justifying grounds do not lie ready to hand: they need to be discovered and suitably expressed, sometimes by lucky guesses, somethings by noting the requirements of theory. For publicity allows that all can justify their conduct to everyone else (when their conduct is reasonable and in according with the laws of God) without self-defeating or other disturbing consequences. #RandolphHarris 18 of 22

Moral elements of the original position in the form of general conditions and the veil of ignorance and the like are important to employ because they allow us to see more clearly how justice requires us to go beyond a concern for our own interest. Only if humans have a sense of justice and do therefore respect one another, will the principles of justice be effective; the notion of respect or of inherent worth of persons is not a suitable basis for arriving at these principles. It is precisely these ideas that call for interpretation. The situation is analogous to that of benevolence: without the principles of right and justice, the aims of benevolent and the requirements of respect are both undefined; they presuppose these principles already independently derived. Once the conception of justice is on hand, however, the ideas of respect and of human dignity can be given a more definite meaning. Among other things, respect for persons is shown by treating them in ways that they can see to be justified. However, more than this, it is manifest in the content of the principles to which we appeal. Thus to respect persons is to recognize that they possess an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. It is to affirm that the loss of freedom for some is not made right by a greater welfare enjoyed by others. The lexical priorities of justice represent the value of persons that is beyond all price. Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. The feelings connecting with the primacy of justice allows us to understand that justice as fairness is the outcome of a rational society because it articulates the principles in the United States Constitution. #RandolphHarris 19 of 22

The theory of justice is a viable systematic doctrine and the idea of maximizing the good does not hold sway by default. Thus what we are doing is to combine into one conception the totality of conditions that we are ready upon due reflection to recognize as reasonable in our conduct with regard to one another. One we grasp this conception, we can at any time look at the social World from the required point of view. It suffices to reason in certain ways and to follow the conclusions reached. This standpoint is also objective and expresses our autonomy. Without conflating all persons into one but recognizing them as distinct and separate, it enables us to be impartial, even between persons who are not contemporaries but who belong to many generations. Thus to see our place in society from the perspective of this position is to see it sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal points of view. The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place beyond the World, not the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the World. And having done so, they can, whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as one lives by the, each from one’s own standpoint. #RandolphHarris 20 of 22

To the ancients, as well as to many contemporary seekers, the World is alive with spirit. The surrounding landscape is infused with creativity and meaning and each place speaks to us of the divine. If one could attain it, purify of heart would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command from the point of view of justice as fairness. Jesus Christ’s sacrifice for sin and salvation from spiritual death are available to all. As we receive the Saviour’s cleansing, healing, and strengthening power, we not only walk justly and humbly with God, we also learn to love mercy the way that Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ. Every day is a God, each day is a God ad holiness holds forth in time. The Earth is more than real estate and if we have a wonderful sense of the divine it is because we live amid such awesome magnificence. God is in the arched sky; He looks out from every stary. God is spread out like a legible language upon the beautiful face of the unsleeping ocean. God is the poetry of Nature; He is that which uplifts the spirit within us. Earth is a bountiful community of living beings of which we are only one part. And each living being has an inner presence and dignity apart from any value we humans may place upon it. While certain places always have been recognized for the powerful presence of their unique localities or landforms, these places are not isolated entities. All the physical things that make up our daily life share a common spiritual reality—as such they are all to be revered and respect. #RandolphHarris 21 of 22

Lord, the air smells good today, straight from the mysteries within the inner courts of God. A grace like new clothes thrown across the garden, free medicine for everybody. The trees in their prayer, the birds in praise, the first blue violets kneeling. Whatever came from Being is caught up n being, drunkenly forgetting that way back. Thou didst establish the Sabbath and didst accept it offerings, prescribing the order of its service. They that delight in the Sabbath have a glorious heritage; they who partake of it, merit life’s highest joy, and they that love its observance have thus chosen true distinction. At Sinai our forefathers were commanded to keep the Sabbath; and Thou didst ordain, O Lord our God, that they bring the additional Sabbath offering as set forth in the Torah. Thou didst create the World from old completing Thy work by the seventh day. Loving us and exalting us above all tongues, Thou didst sanctify us by Thy commandments, and didst bring us near unto Thy service, O our King, calling us by Thy great and holy name. As a token of Thy love, O Lord our God, Thou didst also give us Sabbaths for rest and New Moons for forgiveness. Because we and our forefathers sinned against Thee, our city America has been laid waste, our Sanctuary is desolate, our splendour has gone into exile, and the glory has been removed from the abode of our life. Therefore we cannot fulfill our obligations in Thy chosen House, the great and holy Temple, which was called by Thy name, because of the destruction that has become upon Thy Sanctuary. #RandolphHarris 22 of 22

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