Only if we know the conscious and unconscious motivation of why people commit crimes, an offender’s behavior can be fully understood. It is likely true of most jurisdictions that the bulk of auto stealing can be attributed to transportation and recreation motives. Some portion of transportation motives involve the use of stolen vehicles for the anonymity they provide when doing other crime; however, this would probably account for a lesser proportion than the perceived need to steal a car simply to get somewhere. For the most part, auto theft appears by and large to be a crime against the property rights of others in the sense of unauthorized use. Where youth are involved, motives for automobile stealing are largely affective, and the heightened sense of risk-taking among today’s youth has served to enlarge thrill- and status-seeking motives. The past decade has witnessed the cultivation of a daredevil ethic now rooted in popular culture and much of youth-focused product advertising. This growing desire to feel the “rush” of fear-induced adrenaline appears to have been the major driving force behind the massive increase in auto stealing in America. Most in the sample described their auto stealing as thrill-seeking behavior from which they derive an “adrenaline rush” unmatched by legitimate thrill activities like skiing or snowboarding. “I got hooked on the thrill,” said one 16-year-old reflecting on his commitment to auto theft. Seventy-one percent of the sample described themselves as thrill-seekers. #RandolphHarris 1 of 21

The appeal of auto theft in this respect was threefold: driving fast and recklessly; the prospect of getting into a police pursuit; and the prospect of getting caught. For many in the sample, thrill and status seeking were intertwined: “I like to shock people, intimidate them, make them back down. We used to play tag with stolen cars and my friends couldn’t believe the things I would do.” (17-year-old.) “I like crime. I like to get in police chases. I do crimes for the adrenaline rush. Car theft, B&E, smash and grab, whatever.” (15-year-old.) Offenders with varying involvement in auto theft were interviewed. The most public in the sample claimed to have stolen hundreds of cars in recent years; the least active offender said he took three in his life. For the most part, differences in the level of auto theft involvement among offenders living in different regions of the province appear to be a function of urban versus rural living. The lack of anonymity perceived by youth in small towns appears to be a significant deterrent. All of the low-involvement offenders in this sample lived in towns in California. The automobile stealing they described was very opportunistic: they took vehicles left running in driveways on cold winter mornings. These offenders were inhibited both by a limited local street network and by the perceived likelihood of being caught if they drove the stolen car through towns where residents know each others’ vehicles. #RandolphHarris 2 of 21

Of course each interviewed offender was uniquely motivated to steal automobiles; however, many described themselves and their motivations in ways that made it possible to draw some generalizations. What follows are profiles for the three most evident auto stealing personalities encountered in the interviews with young offenders: Acting Out Joyriders—most emotionally disturbed of the offenders interviewed—likes to convince his or her peers that he or she is crazy. Engages in outrageous driving stunts—dangerous to pursue. Vents anger via car—responsible for large proportion of totaled and burned cars. Most committed to crime—irrational, immature. Least likely to be deterred—does not care what happens. Thrill-Seeker—heavily into drugs—doing crime is a way to finance the habit—entices others to feel the “rush” of doing crime. Engages in car stunts and willful damage to cars, but also steal them for transportation and to use in other crimes. Steals parts for sale in loosely structured friendship network. If automobiles become too difficult to steal, likely to look for the “rush” elsewhere. “Rush” might be legitimately substituted. Instrumental Offender—doing auto theft for the money—most active of the offenders but the smallest proportion of the sample—connected to organized theft operations. Rational, intelligent—does crimes with least risk—gravitated to auto theft from burglary—thinks about outcomes doing crime while young offender status affords them lenient treatment—indicate that they will quit crime at age 18. #RandolphHarris 3 of 21

Even among this sample of multiple-offense, persistent young offender, thrill-seeking motives were identified in more than half of their auto thefts. One variant of joyriding often incorporates deliberate destruction of the vehicles—68 percent indicated that they had stolen vehicles for the express purpose of “trashing” them. “It’s not your car: You can do whatever you want, beat it up, go as fast as you want, bake the tires, do jumps.” (16-year-old.) Many offender expressed the belief that this kind of activity did not really hurt anyone as the vehicles they typically stole to intentionally wreck were “old beaters” whose owners “probably got insurance money to buy a better one.” However, that is an uneducated statement. Some of these people bought their cars brand-new, when they were employed, paid them off, kept up the maintenance on them, and may have retired, be out of work, or cannot afford to buy the same car brand new and do not want a use car. So stealing their car might hurt them, and they have to pay a large deductible. There simply is no victimless crime. Profit-motivated automobile stealing in this sample was evidenced in two areas: vehicle acquisition for a adult-run theft ring; haphazard stripping of joyrider and thrill-seeker, instrumental offenders expressed little interest in adrenaline producing behavior. They took precautions to avoid police and usually worked alone. They possessed a reflective, business-like attitude about their crime of choice and this is what probably enabled them to find work with relatively rare organized theft rings. #RandolphHarris 4 of 21

“The newbies [younger kids just beginning their frequent involvement in automobile stealing] are real heat scores [do things that attract police attention]. They wear the black Bulls [NBA team logo] skull caps and drive like idiots. If the guys I steal for ever saw one of them around, I’d never get another call. (17-year-old.) Perhaps the simplest way to dichotomize the targets of auto theft is to think in terms of supply and demand. Instrumental motives for automobile stealing are driven by the demand for certain models sought in whole or for their parts. Why? People who like to drive fast and take risks much of the time (exempli gratia, immature individuals) are drawn to vehicles engineered and marketed for this “need for speed.” They buy America “muscle cars” like Mustangs, Camaros, and Corvettes; European sports coupes like BMW M3, M4, M6, Z4, M8 and Japanese sports cars like Honda Accord, Acura NSX; of if they are looking for off-road thrills, 4X4 pick-ups and sport utility vehicles. One would expect that risk-taking drivers would crash with greater frequency, driving the demand for replacement parts. Because they are likely at fault in the majority of their crashes, drivers of these kinds of vehicles are greatly motivated to cover needed repairs outside the legitimate economy where they can stretch their repair outside the legitimate economy to their fleet proportions, the kinds of models identified above are overrepresented in organized auto theft activities uncovered by police stings and task forces in many jurisdictions. The targets of instrumental theft, then, are in response to the demand for specific models. #RandolphHarris 5 of 21

On the affective motivation side, we would not expect to see much in the way of target specificity aside from general performance requirements—sporty cars that go fast and impress girls, or 4X4 trucks and sport utility vehicles sought for off-road thrill potential. A supply orientation should dominate this realm wherein largely opportunistic offenders steal whatever is most readily available. A victimization survey done for the large study found that 20 percent of vehicles were stolen with the owners’ keys, roughly half of which were left in the ignition or elsewhere in the vehicle. As might be expected, no target specificity was exhibited amongst this subset of auto thefts—any car with the keys in it will do as far as most thrill or transportation seeking offenders are concerned. We did, however, find pronounced model specificity for the passenger vehicles. Virtually all interviewed offenders identified older Japanese models as the targets of choice for thrill and transportation motives due to the relative ease with which their door and ignition locks could be defeated with ordinary objects such as scissors or screwdrivers. Simplistic, brute force techniques are the favored modus operandi of juvenile delinquents everywhere, and so it is with young car thieves. We were able to quantify the degree of this target specificity by analyzing insurance claims data relative to the fleet of licensed passenger vehicles. When theft rates by vehicle make (exempli gratia, Chevrolet, Ford, Mazda, et cetera) were rank-ordered, we found that Japanese nameplates occupying eight of the 10 makes most at risk. #RandolphHarris 6 of 21

Japanese makes are very popular in North America. In the early 1990, they accounted for roughly one-quarter of the fleet; however, the 10-year-old models most at risk of theft made up a much smaller proportion. Insurance claim data analyses replicated following the sharp auto theft increase witnessed between 1995 and 1996 found that passenger vehicles manufactured by U.S.A. conglomerate Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge, Jeep, Eagle, Mitsubishi—makes exhibiting the lowest theft rates in the early 1990s—to be most disproportionately at risk of theft. Largely ignored in the first half of the decade, automobile stealers learned in the intervening years that many older Chrysler, Plymouth, Dodge products were likewise vulnerable to their favored brute-force techniques. In 1996, 30 passenger vehicle models making up just 12 percent of the fleet accounted for more than a third of all auto thefts in the province. The most obvious implication regarding the relative rarity of favorite targets has to do with offender search patterns. If they settled on wandering about aimlessly in the hopes of finding the relatively few vehicles on which their limited theft skillset would likely work, motivated offenders would waste huge amounts of time. This limited competence funnels them to places where they are apt to find their favorite prey—large parking lots. Conveniently, the large amounts of time young offenders spend in and around shopping malls provide a good match between their routine activities and sufficiently large pool of easy-to-steal vehicles. Mall parking lots were noted as prime “hunting grounds.” Roughly a third of the offenders thought underground parking lots the best place to steal vehicles. #RandolphHarris 7 of 21

The practical motive for research on personality adjustment seem to be the attainment of a state of affairs having a specific behavioral and emotional content deemed “good.” However, one man’s happiness is another man’s gloom. We reject such a formulation because while we no doubt share the middle-class norms which are idealized, they too often imply a sort of subcultural ethnocentrism that neither can nor should be forced upon other segments of society, it treats conflict as evil in itself, and conceives it unrealistically as unnatural and expungable, and by setting up a stable state of affairs as the end of action by family agencies, it dooms such action to inevitable futility, while closing the door to the exploration and the discovery of new experience and forms in family life. Joint involvement in constructive activity is much more than absence of disagreement. Quite apart from the intricate and unresolved methodological problem of getting operational definitions and objective measures of adjustment and maladjustment, the basic concept seems to have passed the peak of its popularity a decade or so ago. Research devoted to determining the conditions of adjustment in families evokes less and less interest, while critics multiply. The historian of ideas may eventually associate it with the period of the depression, while the notion of traits may perhaps be associated with a still earlier period in which a man’s character was alleged to be his fate, a fate predestined because impervious to change. #RandolphHarris 8 of 21

Thus interpersonal competence is neither a trait nor a state. Competence denotes capabilities to meet and deal with a changing World, to formulate ends and implements them. The incessant problem of equipping human beings to handle their affairs and to progress toward the discovery of new values and new means is not solved by authoritarian indoctrination of static attributes and beliefs. To rely upon such methods would not only be subversive of the most fundamental of American democratic values but would ultimately result in failure of the system which sought to maintain itself by these means. If merely given freedom, on the other hand, there are no grounds for assuming that human nature will “unfold” into competent personalities. Somewhere between these extremes lies a conception of personalities not inflexibly bound to and molded by the past, nor by utopian absolutists eager to sacrifice the present generation, but capable of utilizing past experience and future aspirations in an effective organization of present effort; not dependent upon direction from without but capable of integrating their goals with those of other and collaborating in their realization; in short, able to cope with their World whether the formulas devised by predecessors fit or not. The developmental approach, while considerably more suitable than concepts of compatibility and adjustment for evaluating family functioning, is still somewhat encrusted with earlier associations. The notion of maturity, for example, is a rather ambiguous term, which deserves scrutiny. #RandolphHarris 9 of 21

In the normal physical development of a child from infancy to adulthood, the final stage of growth is usually called maturity. When applied to the development of the child’s personality, however, the idea of maturity frequently becomes a misleading organic analogy. And when a phrase like “emotional maturity” begins to be used as an epithet by which some adults pronounce moral judgements upon other, its utility has almost vanished. From the standpoint of interpersonal behavior, personality development is a continuous process. Not only must there be intermittent adaptation to those conditions beyond the control of the person, but a person must constantly set oneself a fringe of new objectives. This is especially so in a dynamic society, for it is only thus that a person must constantly set oneself a fringe of new objectives. This is especially so in a dynamic society, for it is only thus that a person can resist the welter of conflicting influences which play upon one daily, and organize a more or less unified scheme of autonomous action. The confusion of age norms with stages of growth is one of the more harassing connotations of the maturity concept because of its incomplete emergence from biology and child psychology. This confusion is especially acute in the more rivalrous subcultures of the American community, where children’s progress relative to other children is watched with a jealous eye by their parents. #RandolphHarris 10 of 21

An adequate concept of personality development recognizes the full potential range of qualitative differentiation; it requires the measurement of development of a child or an adult against one’s previous self or one’s authentic peers, rather than against extraneous competitive norms. To impose competitive norms in a punitive manner is often discouraging or destructive for development, though intended to be motivating. As central concepts in family research, adjustment has not superseded compatibility, nor has maturity outdated adjustment, in any neat and clear-cut manner; at most there has been a series of successive emphases. This is particularly true in connection with the concept of adaptability, which was first used effectively in family research by Robert C. Angell in the early 1930’s, yet has recently been more fully elaborated by Burgess and Wallin, as particularly appropriate to companionate family relationships. Despite its early use, adaptability appears to be a concept which I transitional from adjustment to competence as a way of looking at family behavior. As used by Burgess and Wallin, it partake also of a realistic developmental approach: if their development is unimpeded, persons do not automatically become adapted to a wide range of situations; rather, if conditions do not permit this kind of learning, they acquire adaptability through formulating diverse ways of coping with problematic situations, and they may acquire instead quite maladaptive modes of performance. #RandolphHarris 11 of 21

There is a passivity of the will—the “will” being the helm, so to speak, of the ship. This originates from a wrong conception of what full surrender to the ultimate concern means. Thinking that a “surrender will” to God means no use of the will at all, the believer ceases to choose, determine, and act of one’s own volition. Powers of darkness will disguise the seriousness of this, and at first the consequences may seem trivial and be scarcely noticeable. In fact, the initial changes may appear to be glorifying to the ultimate concern. The “strong-willed” person suddenly becomes complacent and yielding—no longer “obnoxious” to one’s acquaintances. One believes that the ultimate concern is “willing for him”—through circumstances and in the decisions of other people—and so one becomes more and more helpless in one’s actions. After a time no decision can be obtained from one in matters of daily life; no resolve or initiative in matters demanding action. One becomes afraid to express a wish, much less a decision. Others must choose, decide, act, lead, while one drifts as a cork upon the waters. Later on, the powers of darkness begin to make capital out of this “surrendered” believer, and to weave around one various kinds of psychopathology which entangle one through one’s passivity of will. One has now no power to protest or resist. Conditions which are obviously wrong—springing from things which this believer alone has a right to deal with—flourish, and grow strong and blatant. #RandolphHarris 12 of 21

The powers of darkness have slowly gained because of one’s passivity of will, which at first was merely submission to one’s environment under the idea that the ultimate concern was “willing” for him in all things round one. The text that such believers misinterpret is Philippians 2.13, “It is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for His good pleasure.” The “passive” person reads it as “It is God who works in me the willing and the doing,” id est, “God wills instead of me.” The verse actually speaks of God working in the believer’s soul up to the point of the action of one’s will, but the undiscerning reader assumes that God Himself doe all the “willing” and the “working.” This wrong interpretation justifies his inactivity. Three aspects of faith as ultimate concern—its indivisible totality, unrelatedness to traditional notions, and vagueness of content—do contribute to a certain bafflement about it. However, there is another side to the coin: the intensity of faith which is conveyed by stressing its totality, the freshness of this thought which does not mouth staid formulas, and the exhilarating sweep of the universality of faith. The universality of faith raises a question about its content. There is an intrinsic difficulty of explaining faith: Faith is a concept—and a reality—which is difficult to grasp and to describe. This cannot be otherwise, since faith is not a phenomenon beside others, but the central phenomenon in man’s personal life, manifest and hidden at the same time. Let faith not grab you. Faith is a primary notion, a primary reality; it cannot be properly defined, but only experienced. #RandolphHarris 13 of 21

Focusing on international relations, a great challenge facing Japan is how to cope with the coming de-massification of a society that has been propagandized into believing that homogeneity is always a virtue. More than a three decades ago, anthropologist Kazuko Tsurumi of Sophia University pointed out that there is more diversity in Japan than its leaders acknowledge. However, this was diversity within the framework of a homogenizing Second Wave society. As Japan enters the Third Wave era it will face potentially explosive heterogenizing pressures. Its antagonism to social, economic, and cultural diversity is directly related to its greatest long-term weakness of all. Today’s Japanese are no longer the “economic powerhouse” they were once accused of being, and their national power no longer rests on a single leg of the power triad. However, in the most important power competition—the generation and diffusion of ideas, information, imagery, and knowledge—they still lag behind the United States of America. With these various power resources to deploy, Japan’s business and political leaders lack a clear international strategy. A consensus exists at the top about certain key domestic goals. These include expansion of the domestic economy and reduction of the need to export, improvement of the quality of life through increased leisure, and reclamation of the heavily fouled environment. #RandolphHarris 14 of 21

However, if any, Japan’s elites are deeply split over foreign economic policy that Japan should play in the future. One strategy presupposes that the World will break into regions and that Japan’s role should be to dominate the East Asian/Pacific Region. This means concentrating investment and international assistance there. It means quietly preparing for the role of regional police power. Such a policy reduces Japan’s vulnerability to American and European protectionism. A second approach suggests that Japan concentrate instead on the developing economies, wherever they may be. If they are to plug into the World economy, a variation of this approach proposes that Japan focus on creating the electronic infrastructures needed by these countries. (Such a strategy fills a critical need for the “meticulous” countries of the World, draws on Japanese technological strengths, and helps lock these economies electronically into Japan’s.) A third strategy, perhaps the most widely held at present, sees Japan’s mission as global, unconfined to any particular region. Its backers push for a “global mission, not because of some messianic economy is too big, too varied, too fast-growing to be contained within a single region or country group. #RandolphHarris 15 of 21

It is this “globalist” faction that urged the dispatch of navy ships to help the United States of America and its allies protect the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. It is this group that favors making loans to Eastern Europe, playing a larger and larger diplomatic role on the World stage, assuming dominant positions in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other global institutions. When Japan makes its decision among these three strategies, it will not be clear-cut. The Japanese way is frequently to split differences. Yet astute observers will be able to judge which way the bamboo stick falls. At that point, the World will first begin to feel the real impact of Japan’s thrust toward tomorrow. Often times, financial crisis occur in the West and other parts of the World because no one—neither state, nor top managers, nor shareholders—put the transactions with tricky financial instruments under proper control before it is too late. Financiers entrusted to carry out those transactions eventually get a free hand, make unbelievably big money and, finally, overdo it. However, this is also because wages are not keeping up with inflation, and we have a consumer driven economy, so people have to borrow to survive. Collateralized debt obligations (CDO) often tend to be the most toxic element of the financial markets today. When an investment banker talks of toxicity, a regulator is bound to take a heightened interest. However, sometimes the transactions in question remain out of the regulators’ sight. The state frequently fails to fulfill the major role it has to play in the market economy: setting the rules for doing business and enforcing businesspeople to comply. #RandolphHarris 16 of 21

This can lead to Western capitalism’s major structural failure. Insurance companies sometimes buy products they do not understand because they are attracted to higher returns on offer. Little attention may be paid to any potential risk because the rewards are so attractive. This is why some define CDO buyer as naïve capital. The CDO buyers who do not bother to understand the product, and to assess risks, are not limited to insurance companies, but, as mentioned, include banks, investment funds, and other financial institutions as well as nonfinancial corporations. Risk models created and used by banks to meet regulatory requirements do not always identify CDO as risky instruments. Do not know, do not care, did not do. All these “technical” things, or rather, problems with basic work attitudes and the lack of responsibility on the part of people in charge, are, of course, a key part of financial debacles. Collateralized debt obligations are pools of several debts that led to the 2008 economic crisis and have been making a comeback. In 2021, a similar asset class known as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) became prominent, but these assets may be much more resistant to causing economic downturns or being affected by them. In 2021, CLO issuance in the U.S.A. totaled $184.4 billion and resulted in returns between 1.4 percent and 8.9 percent. Collateralized debt obligations repacked individual loans into securities and they are then sold to investors on the secondary market. The perception of a Western, namely Anglo-Saxon corporate system as shareholders’ capitalism, meaning that shareholders exercise effective control over managers preventing the latter’s too risky and irresponsible actions proved to be a myth. #RandolphHarris 17 of 21

In real life, it turned out to be exactly the opposite. Shareholders of leading financial institutions and a number of nonfinancial companies, which collapsed in 2008-2009 because of managers’ adventurism, greed, or inability to find solutions for pressing problems, failed to stand up to protect their interests and to stop mismanagement. They packaged with subprime mortgages, rated as safer than they truly were and offloaded to investors while the very banks peddling them took out short positions at the same time. These trading patterns led to massive inflation in the housing market, and caused a sharp contraction in the economy. In the failed financial institutions and companies, the shareholders’ voices were unheard. Nonexecutive directors, who were supposed to protect their interests and exercise control over managers, were too aggregable and/or were not provided enough access to important information. In the 2020a, the CDO market is expected to rebound. Whereas the CDO market stood at roughly $70 billon in 2017 (compared to more than $200 billion pre-crisis 2008), it is expected to reach $158.5 billion by 2026. We have already talked about what CDO are. Now, what actually happens is you have a pool of corporate credits. They do not all have to be good credits; some can be junk bonds. The creation of tranches is done largely with respect to mathematical models rather than corporate credits. As a result, there is little understanding of the actual risk to a CDO based on the credits it contained. Instead, it is a numbers game detached from true security. #RandolphHarris 18 of 21

There were a few reasons CDOs became attractive pre-crisis. For banks, they helped offload risk onto investors and freed up more capital to make new investments or issue new loans. For investors, they purportedly offered a way to realize higher yields with the expectation that the riskier aspects of the CDO were supported by the less-risky asses. Unfortunately, speculation and unwarranted optimism in the housing market undercut those expectations. They were rating these things based on the probability of the loss of the pool of assets, rather than the creditworthiness of each individual borrower. That is where they got into trouble and lost a bunch of money. There were big losses on CDOs, and rating agencies came under fire for that as well. The typical buyers of CDOs were insurance companies, banks, pension funds and hedge funds, rather than individuals. These were the institutions left holding the debt when the financial crisis hit, and the losses precipitated the rest of the country just as the value of homes—often individual Americans’ largest source of equity—was crashing. In reality, the dominant stake holders of a large Western, namely, Angelo-Saxon corporation are not stakeholders, but rather high-ranking managers. Their dominance, often effectively uncontested, leads to a decision-making monopoly, while their responsibility for the outcome remains obscure. Among other things, they have obtained enormous power to set their own revenues at fantastically high levels, often without a linkage with the corporation’s performance and profitability. #RandolphHarris 19 of 21

In this sense, Anglo-Saxon capitalism is not itself anymore. Some of its very basic concepts have ceased to apply. Furthermore, this real Western corporate model is not in agreement with the basic idea of the market economy as such. It is a dictatorship, rent-seeking, and rent-taking based on personal power. Besides enormous economic losses it incurs, it destroys values and ideals embedded in the fabric of liberal Western societies, causing the deepest crisis of confidence since the late 1980s, when Americans were losing badly in its competition with rapidly rising Japan, and Eurosclerosis was the most popular definition for the status of major economies of the old continent. Bankers’ moves to aggressively protect their cosmic bonuses, even after their institutions collapsed and were bailed out by the state with the use of taxpayers’ money, manifest a destruction of Western business and societal ethics, or rather their remnants. The financiers’ most popular argument that unless the bonuses are left intact talented people (did they mean those talented people who had engineered the financial fiasco?) would not stay is both cynical and confusing. It goes against the basic principle the market economy rests upon: Businesspeople have to bear responsibility for their decisions and actions. Logically, if this principle still really mattered, in such a situation it would have been irrelevant and ridiculous to pay any bonuses at all. #RandolphHarris 20 of 21

Government bailouts should have been accompanied not only by bonuses bans, but also by mandatory replacements of all high-ranking managers of the business entities rescued, with punitive financial measures against those who were responsible for the failures. No government was bold enough to go that far. The truth, and one of the greatest social injustices of the early twenty-first century, is that today, in the aftermath of the crisis, those who engineered it are mostly doing fine and living a jolly life, while millions of people it broke down are still struggling with its repercussion and COVID hurt their rebound. This manifests one more failure of Western capitalism: a moral failure. Or maybe, in the World of Western financial business the very notion of morality had already been killed altogether? The investigation showed that in the wake of the crisis, in a desperate effort to arrange any cash flow, for example, the Wachovia Bank, one of the largest in the United States of America (in 2008 it was acquired by Wells Fargo), laundered money of the Mexican drug mafia on a scale equaling one-third of Mexico’s GDP. The Bank of America was also involved in operations of this kind. Surprisingly (or not surprisingly?) it did not become a big story in the news and was not widely discussed by the public. For Wachovia it was quite a happy end as it avoided criminal prosecution paying out almost a symbolic fine of $160 million. Meanwhile the bank reportedly had no way of checking $420 billion (?!) in transactions for possible money laundering activity. This is a bit too much, is it not? #RandolphHarris 21 of 21